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Conflict of Laws 
by John A. Gorfinkel* 
The Choice of Law Process-Injuries to Person or Property 
This is the year of Reich v. Purcell, 1 a case that is simple 
on its facts but far reaching in its effects on the development of 
the choice of law process in California. Mrs. Reich, the wife 
of Lee Reich, and their two children were driving from Ohio 
to California, where they contemplated settling. In Missouri 
their car collided with a motor vehicle owned and operated 
by the defendant, a California resident. The wife and one 
child were killed. Plaintiffs were the surviving husband and 
child who, prior to the commencement of the action, became 
domiciled in California. Missouri has a statutory limitation 
of $25,000 on recovery in wrongful death actions; California 
* A.B. 1926,1.0. 1929, J.S.D. 1931, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Dean and Professor of Law, Golden 
Gate College, School of Law. Mem-
ber, California State Bar. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to Robert F. Lee, student at Golden 
6 
Gate College, School of Law, for assist-
ance in preparation of this article. 
1. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31. 
432 P.2d 727 (1967). See Comments 
on Reich v. Purcell. 15 UCLA Law 
Rev. 551-654 (1968). 
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and Ohio have no such limitation. On appeal, liability and 
damages were stipulated and the only issue was whether the 
judgment in the action for the wife's death should be $55,000 
actual loss, or $25,000, under the Missouri limitation. 
Four courses of action were open to the court: 
(1) It could apply the Missouri limitation, following tradi-
tional theori that.the law of the place of the tort, i.e., the 
place of impact, controlled; 
(2) It could apply Ohio substantive law on the theory that 
Ohio was the interested state, since plaintiffs were still domi-
ciled there at the time of the injury;3 
(3) It could apply the law that Ohio would apply, in-
cluding its choice of law rule, modifying the second suggested 
course of action by the invocation of the renvoi doctrine;4 
( 4) It could apply the substantive law of California on 
the dual grounds that California was the forum and the in-
terested state by virtue of plaintiffs' contemplated domicile 
at the time of injury and actual domicile at the time suit was 
commenced. 
The supreme court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the 
mechanical test of the lex loci delicti in favor of an approach 
which would consider the interests of the three states in-
volved, concluded that the interest of Ohio should control, 
and applied the substantive law of Ohio. 
What does this mean, as a guide to the development of 
choice of law "rules" in tort cases? 
First, and most clearly and emphatically, the vested-rights 
approach is now expressly repudiated. What was formerly 
disguised in Grant v. McAuliffe,5 is now openly avowed. 
2. 67 Cal.2d at 553, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
33, 432 P.2d at 729. See Slater v. 
Mexican National Ry. Co., 194 U.S. 
120,48 L.Ed. 900, 24 S.Ct. 581 (1904); 
Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 
P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. J264 (1932). Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws § 378 et 
seq. 
3. 67 Ca1.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
at 34, 432 P.2d at 730. 
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4. This possibility is not suggested 
in the opinion and would clearly be 
contrary to the great weight of author-
ity in the United States which rejects 
reI/mi. Cf. the concurring opinion in 
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty, 7 
Wis.2d J30, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). 
5. 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 
A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953). 
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Loranger v. Nadeau,s Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon CO.,7 
"and other cases to the contrary [e.g. Victor v. SperryB] are 
overruled."9 California thus joins with New York,lo Penn-
sylvania,ll Wisconsin/2 and others13 in rejecting the view 
that the law of the impact state creates the cause of action 
and determines the existence and extent of the rights and 
obligations of the parties. 
Second, and equally clearly and emphatically, the rejection 
of the law of the place of the tort does not, either directly or 
indirectly, produce any new law-finding or jurisdiction-finding 
device. A new technique must be employed in the choice of 
law process. 
Third, and most significant, is the articulation and develop-
ment of this technique, and it is here that the decision in 
Reich v. Purcell will have its greatest impact. The opinion 
proceeds essentially along the path suggested in the writings 
of Brainerd Currie.14 The governing principle is: "The forum 
must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the 
interests of the litigants and the involved states."15 This prin-
ciple is simple to state; the problems arise in its application. 
The notable contribution of the opinion is its analysis of 
the forces that bear upon the question of determining the in-
terests that are to be served. The interest of Missouri in the 
precise question at issue in Reich was quickly disposed of. 
6. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63, 84 
A.LR. 1264 (1932). 
7. 153 Cal. 438, 95 P. 862 (1908). 
8. 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 329 P.2d 
728 (1958). 
9. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
at 34, 432 P.2d at 730. 
10. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
95 A.LR.2d I (1963). 
11. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). 
12. Haumschild v. Continental Cas-
ualty, 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 
(1959). 
13. See generally R. Leflar, A mericall 
Conflicts Law, Ch. 14 at p. 325 et seq. 
(1968) . 
14. See B. Currie, Selected Essays all 
the Conflict of Laws (1963), and par-
ticularly Notes on Methods and Ob-
jectives in the Conflict of Laws, Duke 
LJ. 171, (1959), reprinted in Selected 
Essays, 177 et seq. For analysis of the 
opinion in the light of the Currie ap-
proach, see Comments on Reich v. 
Purcell by Herma Hill Kay, 15 UCLA 
Law Rev. 584 et seq., and David P. 
Currie, 15 UCLA Law Rev. 595 et 
seq. 
15. 67 Cal.2d at 553, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
at 33, 432 P.2d at 729. 
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The measure of damages may be looked at from plaintiffs' 
viewpoint as compensation to the survivors or from defendant's 
viewpoint as avoiding an excessive financial burden. How-
ever, since no party was a Missouri resident or a resident of a 
state with a similar limitation, no interest of any party or 
of any such state would be served by imposing the damage 
limitation. 
The choice was narrowed to Ohio and California. Since 
their laws and policies were the same, there was no need to 
choose between them. However, the court did make the 
choice, presumably to avoid giving undue encouragement in 
the future to forum shoppers. I6 The decision emphasized the 
concept of retention of the last domicile until a new domicile 
is actually created,I7 found that plaintiffs' plans to change 
their domicile from Ohio to California "were not definite and 
fixed",I8 and concluded that California was a disinterested 
forum, as of the date the cause of action arose, and therefore 
had no interest in applying its own law. To hold otherwise, 
the court feared, might encourage injured parties to engage 
in domicile shopping as a prelude to forum shopping. Ohio 
was left as the only interested state, renvoi was rejected, and 
Ohio's internal law was held to govern the issue of damages. 
The decision clarifies what has heretofore been frequently 
suggested, but has been as yet unsettled in California choice of 
law cases. In A laska Packers v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion,I9 California in 1934 rejected a mechanical reliance on 
the law of the place where the injured workman was regularly 
employed and injured, in favor of the law of California as the 
place where he had originally been employed and to which he 
had returned on termination of the employment. 2o Cali-
fornia's interest, stemming from the fact that if the employee 
became a public charge the burden would be felt in California, 
16. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. 18. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
at 34, 432 P.2d at 730. 34, 432 P.2d at 730. 
17. But cf. Matteucci v. Messersmith, 19. I Cal.2d 250, 34 P.2d 716 (1934); 
385 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. [1967]) and affirmed, 294 U.S. 532, 79 L.Ed. 1044, 
proposed text, Restatement of Conflict 55 S.Ct. 518 (1935). 
of Laws, 2d, § 16 Comment (d). 20. I CaI.2d at 261-262, 34 P.2d at 
721-722. 
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was held sufficient to justify taking jurisdiction and making 
an award. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. A 
like approach was taken in 1939 in Pacific Employers Insur-
ance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,r a situation the 
exact converse of the Alaska Packers case. The employee was 
a resident of Massachusetts and was injured while temporarily 
in California in the course of his employment. California took 
jurisdiction and applied its law, finding an interest in the need 
to protect those who had furnished medical and hospital care 
to the injured person. However, in tort cases, the California 
decisions had not followed a clear path. 
In Loranger v. Nadeau,2 the law of Arizona, the place of 
injury, was applied to determine the duty owed to the guest in 
a motor vehicle. In Victor v. Sperry,3 a case involving a col-
lision in Mexico between two vehicles registered in California 
and with all parties California residents, the measure of dam-
ages was held to be controlled by Mexican law. 
On the other hand, in Hudson v. Von Hamm4 and Thome 
v. Macken5 California courts invoked local public policy to 
close their doors to suits based on torts committed elsewhere. 
Departures from the rule of lex loci delicti occurred in Grant 
v. McAulifJe6 where the issue of survival was "characterized" 
as "procedural", and governed by forum law, and in Emery 
v. Emery1 where the issue of intra-family immunity was held 
to be governed by domiciliary law. 
1. 10 Cal.2d 567, 75 P.2d 1058 
(1938); affirmed, 306 U.S. 493, 83 L. 
Ed. 940, 59 S.Ct. 629 (1939). 
2. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63, 84 
A. L. R. 1264 (1932). 
3. 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 329 P.2d 
728 (1958). See the criticism of this 
decision in 1. Schnake & J. Murad, Con-
flict of Laws-Torts-California, 16 
Hastings L.1. 42 (1964). 
4. 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 P. 374 
(1927). This was a suit by injured par-
ty against the parents of a minor tort-
feasor; the complaint alleged injury in 
Hawaii and the imputed liability of the 
parents under Hawaiian law. 
5. 58 Cal. App.2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 
(1943). This was a suit for alienation 
of affections, in which plaintiffs were 
residents of Oregon and the activity of 
defendant took place in that state. 
Civil Code section 43.5 was held to bar 
relief. Cf. Younker v. Reseda Manor, 
255 Cal. App.2d 431, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 
(1967), discussed infra. 
6. 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 
A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953). 
7. 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 
(1955). 
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The court is now clearly committed. Loranger is expressly 
overruled; Victor v. Sperry may be regarded as overruled; the 
circumlocutions of Grant and Emery are now superfluities. 
How sound is the result as a matter of interest analysis? 
There is no question that the rejection of Missouri law and its 
limitation on damages is proper, and there is also no question 
that the rejection of renvoi in the application of Ohio law is 
also proper. Therefore, viewed solely by its result, the de-
cision is clearly correct. It is arguable, however, that the 
court may have too hastily disclaimed a California interest. 
Concededly, California solely as a forum had no interest, and 
if plaintiffs had never been domiciled in California, there was 
no reason to apply California law. Conceivably, California 
has a positive interest in not encouraging prospective plaintiffs 
to select a California domicile, ex post facto, to enhance their 
claims. But in this case, the plaintiffs were en route to Cali-
fornia when the accident happened, and there was a present, 
good faith, although tentative, decision to remove to Califor-
nia. Under these circumstances, acceptance of a California 
interest would not open the door to forum shopping. Since 
the entire financial burden of the event fell upon persons who 
were California residents at the time of suit, the court might 
well have applied California law. This approach, while ir-
relevant to the ultimate result in Reich, may be vital in other 
cases where the facts are only slightly different. 
And this leads to the next question, what does Reich portend 
for the future? It is clear that while the decision sets a gen-
eral course, it does not purport to answer many of the par-
ticular questions that will arise in the future in analogous, 
but not identical situations. What, for example, would be the 
result, if the defendant were a resident of a state having a limi-
tation on liability? Or, if the plaintiffs were residents of a 
state with a limitation on liability and the accident happened 
in a state without a limitation on liability? Would the result 
in either of these hypothetical cases be changed, if it were 
established that the plaintiffs' decision to remove to California 
had been definite and fixed, the former home disposed of, the 
furniture packed, and the new position accepted, but no new 
86 CAL LAW 1969 
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domicile "established" in the traditional sense? This uncer-
tainty exists; it is undesirable from the point of view of attor-
neys advising clients, but it could hardly be otherwise within 
the framework of the judicial process. The supreme court 
in Reich is functioning in the true common-law tradition,S the 
same tradition manifested in its opinions in other recent choice 
of law cases;9 it is deciding the case before it. Eventually rules 
will emerge, but they will be the product of the decisional 
process in many cases and not the result of an abstract formu-
lation in the course of a single opinion. For the present, 
counsel must rely on suggestions from commentators and in-
terpretations from the courts in subsequent cases. There is 
a plethora of the formerlo and, within the period of this volume, 
three of the latter. To these we now turn. 
Schneider v. Schimmeis,ll so far as relevant to the present 
discussion, was an action for the husband's loss of consortium 
arising out of defendant's alleged wrong to the wife. All 
events occurred in Colorado and all parties were Colorado 
residents at the time of the injury. California was the forum 
only because it was the state to which defendant "happened 
to move,,12 after the event and a series of delays, coupled 
with inadequacies in Colorado's jurisdictional statutes, had 
prevented the Colorado court acquiring in personam jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. I3 Colorado recognizes loss of con-
sortium as an element of damages; California does not. The 
court of appeals, first district, applying the same approach 
as Reich, concluded that the issue involved was one of com-
pensation for a wrong suffered, and that Colorado, as the state 
8. See Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 
32 Cornell L. Q. 137 (1946). 
9. See, notably, Bernkrant v. Fowler, 
55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 
P.2d 906 (1961). 
10. See, for example, Comments on 
Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 
551-654 (1968). 
11. 256 Cal. App.2d 366, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 273 (1967). 
12. 256 Cal. App.2d at 373, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. at 277. 
13. The tale of futile efforts in Colo-
rado is narrated in 256 Cal. App.2d 
at 368-369, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 274-275; 
it covered a period of little less than 
two years and raised a serious question 
of the California statute of limitations 
and the saving provision of section 355 
of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. For another illustration of 
Colorado's jurisdictional problems, see 
Bay Aviation Services Co. v. District 
Court, 149 Colo. 542, 370 P.2d 752 
(1962). 
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of both parties' domicile at the time of injury, had the greater 
interest. California's rule denying recovery for loss of con-
sortium was said not to involve any matter of California in-
terest or public policy but to exist merely "because the 
Legislature has not seen fit to provide for the allowance of such 
damages.,,14 The decision well illustrates how fine the line 
is in these cases, and how much depends upon the manner in 
which the interest involved is defined. If California's rule 
disallowing recovery for loss of consortium were said to be 
based on a policy consideration that such loss could not or 
should not be measured in monetary terms and therefore was 
not compensable, or that as a matter of California "policy" 
no action could be maintained for such an injury, the opposite 
result would seem to be required. 15 
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board,16 the second of the cases, involved the applica-
bility of the California workmen's compensation statute to 
an extremely complex, four-state factual situation. The em-
ployee, a California resident, had registered for employment 
with a Colorado agency. His employment was initiated by 
a telephone conversation with the agency while the employee 
was still in California. Pursuant to the conversation he went 
to Wyoming at his own expense and there entered into a 
written contract of employment. He was injured while on 
assignment in Utah and under a Utah statute received benefits 
that he later sought to augment by application for compen-
sation in California. Resolution of the problem was treated 
as essentially a matter of statutory construction, namely 
whether the employee was working pursuant to a labor con-
tract made in California, since if he was, under sections 5305 
and 3600.5 of the California Labor Code, the California com-
pensation act was applicable.17 
14. 256 Cal. App.2d at 373, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. at 277. 
15. Cf. Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. 
App.2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943); see 
footnote 5 supra, for the facts and 
holding. 
88 CAL LAW 1969 
16. 68 CaI.2d 7, 64 Cal. Rptr. 440, 
434 P.2d 992 (1967). 
17. "Section 5305 of the Labor Code 
provides that the appeals board exercise 
jurisdiction over all controversies aris-
ing out of injuries suffered outside the 
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Thus, this case differs substantially in posture from Reich 
and Schneider. The court did not have to determine the prin-
cipal choice of law rule or the interest of California. The 
legislature had already performed those functions by deter-
mining that California's interest extended to labor contracts 
made in California and that California law was to be applied 
to them. However, the court did have to determine the 
"incidental" or "preliminary" question of where the labor 
contract was made. In resolving this matter, choice of law 
problems and policy considerations did arise in connection 
with three separate issues: (i) was the employment agency 
an agent of the employer, the employee, or neither; (ii) was 
the telephone conversation an oral contract of employment 
made in California; (iii) if an oral contract was made in Cali-
fornia, was the written agreement in Wyoming a rescission of 
or only an implementation of the prior oral contract? 
The California interest was said to be sufficiently strong and 
pervasive to justify the court applying California law to the 
determination of the three sub-issues involved in the prelimi-
nary question. ls The results were that the employment agency 
was found to be the agent of the employer, an oral contract 
was held to have been made in California, and the written 
agreement was regarded as merely amplifying and memorializ-
ing the oral contract. 
There is one curious aspect in this case. The primary con-
cern is to determine when a labor contract may be regarded 
as having been made in California. The court did not address 
itself to the policy considerations involved in applying Cali-
fornia law to determine where the contract is made, or to 
California's interest in holding that labor contracts involving 
state if the injured employee is a Cali-
fornia resident at the time of the injury 
and the contract of employment is en-
tered into in California. Section 3600.5 
provides that if an employee is hired in 
California but injured outside Cali-
fornia he shaH receive compensation 
according to the laws of California. 
The only issue here turns on whether, 
within the meaning of sections 5305 and 
3600.5 of the Labor Code, applicant, 
at the time of his injuries in Utah, was 
working pursuant to an employment 
contract made in California." 68 Cal. 
2d at II, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 442, 434 P.2d 
at 994. 
18. 68 Cal.2d at 13-14, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
at 444, 434 P.2d at 996. 
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California residents are made in California, but rather to the 
policy considerations of applying California law to determine 
the legal consequences of separate incidents in the process of 
making a contract. If, under California law, the writing were 
regarded as a supercession of the prior oral agreement, while 
under Wyoming law it was merely a formalizing of that agree-
ment, would California, in view of its interest in the application 
of its own workmen's compensation law, have concluded 
that, as a matter of California policy, the contract was made in 
California if any substantial event in the negotiations between 
the parties occurred in California or while the California resi-
dent-employee was still in California? Again we have an 
illustration of how much may depend upon the manner in 
which the question is put. Do we ask what is California's 
interest in having this agreement a California contract? Or 
do we ask what is California's interest in applying its law to 
determine the agency status of an employment agency? 
The third case, Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc./9 also 
involved an industrial accident. In this case, the injured 
party was a Nevada resident, working on a Nevada project, 
under a contract made in Nevada-every contact was in 
Nevada except that the general contractor was a California 
corporation. Under Nevada law, the plaintiff, although an 
independent contractor, was subject to the Nevada Industrial 
Insurance Act as the exclusive remedy for his injuries. Under 
California law, if applicable, he could maintain a common-
law tort action against the defendant. California quite prop-
erly held that it had no interest in the matter and refused re-
lief. 
Some recapitulation and synthesis are appropriate, but be-
fore attempting it, two other decisions need to be considered. 
The Choice of Law Process-Contract Rights and Remedies 
Younker v. Reseda Manor20 involved the applicability, in 
a suit in California, of section 580b of the Code of Civil Pro-
19. 262 Cal. App.2d 741, 69 Cal. 20. 255 Cal. App.2d 431, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 56 (1968). Rptr. 197 (1967). 
90 CAL LAW 1969 
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cedure to a Nevada land transaction. This section reads: 
"No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any 
sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete 
his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, 
given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the 
purchase price of real property." The plaintiffs were Nevada 
residents; the defendants were purchasers of Nevada land 
who had given a promissory note, secured by deed of trust 
on the land, for part of the purchase price. The transaction 
was consummated in Nevada and the note was executed and 
payable there. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion fqr a 
summary judgment; the court of appeals reversed. That 
court concluded that section 580b could be applied to the 
transaction, since it purported to relate to actions after de-
fault and was not limited to the proceedings of foreclosure or 
judicial or private sale of the land. The court also concluded 
that section 580b should apply, for two reasons. The first 
reason was that defendants were California residents, and in 
"land sales, where the land is given as security for the debt 
to the vendor, this state has an interest in protecting pur-
chasers from judgments for deficiency."! In other words, 
California's concern about the solvency of its residents may 
justify protecting them against suit in California courts on 
obligations incurred outside California in transactions where 
California does not believe such an obligation should arise. 
This is, it is suggested, a rather provincial and unduly narrow 
view of California's interest. 
The second reason is even harder to justify. The affidavit 
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment averred 
that the parties were concerned about the possibility of a 
deficiency judgment and that the sellers had represented that 
the law of Nevada was the same as that of California in re-
spect to deficiency judgments. This would seem, on its face, 
to indicate that the parties contracted with clear recognition 
that the law of Nevada would govern, but with some doubt 
as to what that law was. If anything, under principles of party 
1. 255 Cal. App.2d at 437, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. at 202. 
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autonomy or the reasonable expectation of the parties, the ap-
plication of Nevada law would seem to be in order. 2 The 
court's treatment of seller's representation is curious. The 
opinion states: 
We do not regard the admissibility of this oral statement 
as related to estoppel in general (which was not pleaded) 
or to fraud, or to attempts to vary the terms of a written 
instrument. On the subject of choice of laws, however, 
where respondents contend that the law of the state where 
they seek to recover should not apply because superior 
contacts of the state of situs exist, we deem it relevant 
to consider the statement alleged (and accepted by us, 
at this stage) to have been made by the prospective 
creditor.3 
Why this is, or should be, relevant, was not discussed. 
A similar problem had been presented in an earlier decision, 
Kish v. Bay Counties Guaranty Co. 4 Kish also involved, in 
part, a Nevada land transaction. The facts are complex and a 
recitation thereof is unnecessary to the matter under discus-
sion. Suffice to say that, in considering the availability of 
section 58Gb as a defense, the court there stated: 
Section 58Gb, on the other hand, destroys rights that 
would otherwise exist, by directing that any satisfaction 
of the debt must come from the land. The protection 
the statute provides is a part of the contract between 
borrower and secured lender. (Emphasis added.) The 
fact that the land lies in another state makes no difference, 
when the contract was made in California and was to be 
performed here. 5 
These decisions have created an unfortunate confusion. 
Under Y ounkers, section 58Gb applies to actions in California 
courts against California residents, regardless of where the 
2. Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 4. 254 Cal. App.2d 725, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 494 (1967). 
(1961). 5. 254 Cal. App.2d at 733, 62 Cal. 
3. 255 Cal. App.2d at 437, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 500. 
Rptr. at 202. 
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contract is made; it is not clear whether that court would apply 
it to actions in California courts against nonresidents. Under 
Kish, section 580b applies to contracts "made in California 
and. . to be performed here"; it is not clear whether 
that court would apply it to contracts made in California and 
to be performed elsewhere. 
The decisions are hopelessly inconsistent in theory and 
approach, and each leaves much unsettled. It is regrettable 
that the supreme court has not clarified this matter; it is to 
be hoped that it will do so at the next opportunity. 
Recapitulation of the Choice of Law Process 
California is now clearly committed to the interest analysis 
approach. This means that the advocate may no longer 
merely direct the court's attention to the geographical locale 
of the event and thereby solve his choice of law problems. 
Rather, the advocate now must first focus attention on the 
precise issue in controversy, then develop the interests of 
the states affected or served by the rule invoked, and finally 
convince the court that the interest which benefits his client 
should prevail. If the legislature has determined the Cali-
fornia policy and asserted the local interest in its application 
(as in the Travelers Insurance case) part of the advocate's 
work is done. But his ingenuity in putting forth the precise 
issue in its most favorable light (as witness again the Travel-
ers case) may well be determinative. 
In taking an over-view of the cases, slight indications of 
a pattern emerge. There was a notable tendency to apply Cali-
fornia policy to favor or protect the interest of a party who 
was a California resident at all relevant times. Thus in 
Travelers, the California Workmen's Compensation Act was 
applied to compensate for an industrial accident in Utah; in 
Younker, California policy was invoked to protect a California 
resident against a deficiency judgment on a purchase money 
mortgage on out-of-state land. Reich's California domicile 
at the time of suit may have been irrelevant in view of the 
congruence between Ohio and California law, but it seems 
clear from the opinion that if plaintiff had been a California 
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resident at the time of the event, California policy would have 
prevailed. Only in Schneider was California policy not in-
voked to aid a California resident; but here California policy 
was neither clear nor significant, and defendant's California 
residence did not exist at the time of the event. 
But the fundamental issue is still one of determining the 
state's interest or policy and this is best illustrated by the 
Younker and Kish decisions. Without critical analysis, 
Younker may seem to be returning to the view that the remedy 
is a matter of procedure and procedure is a matter for the 
forum. In one sense this is true; namely that if the forum 
state does not provide a court, or a remedy, no action is 
maintainable. And we will continue to have instances where 
California, by closing its doors to certain types of cases, will 
prevent recovery. But the real problem in cases such as 
Younker and Kish is to determine the legislative intent, and 
hence California policy or interest. Did the legislature, by 
a statute such as section 580b, intend to bar such suits, or 
to regulate contracts made in California, or to regulate con-
tracts involving California land, or all three or some combina-
tion thereof? That is the question that must be answered 
before California's interest can be determined and the choice 
of law made. 
There is another aspect to cases such as Younker and 
Schneider. Nevada, with a proper jurisdictional statute, could 
have subjected the defendants in Younker to suit in its courts. 
Colorado clearly had the power, in Schneider, to subject the 
defendant to the jurisdiction of its courts in a suit for a tort 
committed in Colorado, particularly when the defendant was 
a Colorado domiciliary at the time of the tort. 
In both cases a proper "long-arm statute" would have en-
abled plaintiff to obtain a judgment in the other state, sue 
in California on the judgment and thus avoid any clash with 
California law and policy. This is particularly important in 
reverse, since California's jurisdictional statutes, so far as indi-
vidual defendants are concerned, are primitive and frequently 
force California plaintiffs to seek relief in another state on 
a California transaction, with the possible application of the 
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other state's policy to defeat the claim.6 As the interest anal-
ysis approach spreads to other jurisdictions, it becomes in-
creasingly important that California courts possess the means 
to acquire jurisdiction over the necessary parties, so that this 
state's policy may be applied to California-based transactions. 
Support Decrees 
May a California court modify a lump-sum alimony and 
child-support agreement that has been completely incorpo-
rated into a Georgia divorce decree that is unalterable in 
Georgia, when the judgment debtor has become a California 
resident? In Elkind v. Byck,7 the California Supreme Court, 
relying on Georgia's adoption of the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act and California Civil Code section 
139 answered this question in the affirmative. 
The defendant-obligor contended that the California court 
was compelled to give full faith and credit to the Georgia 
decree on the authority of the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Yarborough v. Yarborough. s That case dealt with 
South Carolina's power to modify an alimony and child-
support agreement, that was not modifiable under Georgia 
law. The Supreme Court held that South Carolina had 
to give full faith and credit to the Georgia decree. In Elkind, 
the California court held that Yarborough was not controlling 
for two reasons. First, in Yarborough the defendant-obligor 
had maintained his domicile in Georgia, and had satisfied his 
duty under its law, while in Elkind the obligor had removed 
to California and was domiciled here. This, it was said, was 
sufficient to make California law applicable. Second, prior 
to the original decree in Elkind, the Georgia legislature had 
adopted a statute imposing a duty on the part of parents to 
support dependent children and providing that such duty 
6. See for example, Lilienthal v. 7. 68 Cal.2d 453, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404, 
Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 439 P.2d 316 (1968). 
(1964) where California residents, 8. 290 U.S. 202, 78 L.Ed. 269, 54 
forced to sue in Oregon on a California S.Ct. 181, 90 A.L.R. 924 (1933). 
contract, were defeated by application 
of Oregon policies. 
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was to be determined by "the laws of the State where the 
obligor was present during the period for which the support 
is sought".9 There was no similar legislation in effect at the 
time of the Yarborough decree. 
This legislation, the court said, although continuing to make 
the decree non modifiable in Georgia, would allow another 
state in which the obligor then resided to determine whether 
it should modify the decree. "The decree therefore does not 
purport to govern defendant's obligations when he does not 
reside in Georgia."lo This analysis, in effect, enabled Cali-
fornia to give full faith and credit to the Georgia decree, 
as so limited and construed, and still carry out the policy 
of Civil Code section 139, which provides that child support 
agreements are "separate and severable" from other provisions 
of a divorce decree. Thus the trial court had power to modify 
the decree on a proper showing of changed circumstances. 
Dissatisfaction with the Yarborough decision has been fre-
quently expressed by the courts and commentators. Obvi-
ously, the California Supreme Court is not in a position to 
overrule the United States Supreme Court. However, the 
California opinion, while purporting only to distinguish Yar-
borough, carries overtones of basically disagreeing with the 
majority decision and favoring the dissent by Mr. Justice 
Stone. Perhaps the California Supreme Court, by adding its 
great prestige, may help to bring about the realization of 
Professor Ehrenzweig's cogent challenge: 
Support claims of minors have usually been subjected 
to general rules of support recognition which have been 
developed by and for adversary proceedings between 
spouses. This is not always justified. The minor's wel-
fare is a matter of public concern, and neither the forum 
state nor the minor himself were usually represented 
in the proceedings underlying the decree which is sought 
to be enforced . . . Courts are becoming increasingly 
aware of their role as parens patriae. It may be hoped 
9. Ga. Laws 1956, URESA § 6, see 10. 68 Cal.2d at 459, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
Ga. Code Ann. § 99-907(a), cited at 68 at 408. 
Ca1.2d at 456, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 406. 
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that they will in such cases gradually discard 
the formalism which continues to beset the conflicts law 
of domestic relations. And it may be hoped that the 
only decision of the Supreme Court in this field [Y ar-
borough] will not stand in the way of such a develop-
ment. ll 
11. A. Ehrenzweig, COIlf/icts of Law 
(1962) § 85 at 279. 
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